企业预算制定过程中寻租行为的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis On Rent-seeking Problem In The Budgeting Process

作　　者：迈扎尼[1] 刘文敬[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2010年第9期67-70,96,共5页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：在预算制定过程中,因为信息不对称、利益冲突和机会主义的倾向,促使企业各层代理人利用职权在预算制定过程中产生寻租的动机,本文在信息不对称情况下,对企业预算制定过程中的寻租行为进行了博弈分析,构建了寻租博弈模型。依据模型进行分析,得出结论,并提出相关对策建议。In the budgeting process,information asymmetry、interests conflicts and opportunistic tendency prompted the layers to use their power for the rent-seeking motives in the budgeting process.Based on information asymmetry,this paper analyses the rent-seeking behavior in the budgeting process,and constructs the model.Finally,according to the results,Some Suggestions are discussed to reduce the rent-seeking behavior.

关 键 词：预算 寻租 博弈 

分 类 号：F812.3[经济管理—财政学]