中国人真的不能相互信任吗?——关于“韦伯命题”和淘宝案例的分析  

Could Mutual Trust Be Impossible to Chinese People?——On the "Web Proposition" and the Cases of Taobao

作　　者：钱炳[1,2] 周勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096 [2]常州工学院经济与管理学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第5期409-414,共6页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(08BJY086);常州工学院院级资助项目(YN0946)

摘　　要：运用双边市场理论,以委托—代理理论为分析框架,分析了淘宝在线交易平台企业解决信任问题的机制:平台企业提供的市场竞争机制降低了代理人的道德风险行为;平台企业运用权威治理机制监控委托人和代理人的行为并作出奖惩;平台企业还设计了相应的担保制度,防范委托人可能的机会主义行为。淘宝的案例不仅为解决网络社区的信任问题提供了范例,也对"韦伯命题"作出了回答。Based on the theory of two-side markets with the principal-agent theory as the framework for analysis,how did the Chinese leading shopping website Taobao as a trade platform solve the problem of mutual trust between buyers and sellers is studied.It is found that the market competition mechanism provided by the platform reduces the moral hazard to agent.Such a platform has authority to monitor the behavior of both the principal and the agent and to make the system of rewards and penalties effective.Furthermore,a guarantee system is provided on the platform to prevent the principal from the possible opportunistic actions.The cases of Taobao provide not only an example for solving the mutual trust problem of online trade but also a reply to ＂Web proposition＂.

关 键 词：韦伯命题 委托—代理理论 双边市场 平台企业 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]