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机构地区:[1]苏州大学计算机学院江苏省计算机信息处理技术重点实验室,江苏苏州215006
出 处:《计算机应用与软件》2010年第8期120-122,共3页Computer Applications and Software
基 金:江苏省自然科学基金(BK2004039)
摘 要:在分析了P2P网络中充斥着大量Free-Rider节点的问题的基础上,提出一种新型的节点激励模型。在分析现有激励模型的基础上,鉴于古诺模型中利益获取模式与P2P网络中节点贡献与收益模式的相似度,引入博弈论中的超优均衡理论。该模型证明了在P2P系统中每个节点存在一个最优贡献值,只有当节点的贡献值达到该最优值时,才能从系统中获得更好的服务质量。分析证明,该激励模型对P2P网络有着一定的激励作用,并且有效地避免了Free-Rider问题,能够在一定程度上保证P2P系统的良性发展。In this paper we put forward a new incentive model for peers on the basis of analyzing the problem that in P2P network there is full of Free-Rider peers. After analyzing the present incentive models and in view of the similarity between the interest acquiring model in Cournotg duopoly model and the mode of peers'contribution and benefit gaining in P2P network, the super optimizing balance theory in game theory is introduced to the new model. The model demonstrates that each peer in P2P system has an optimal contribution value, only when the peer' s contribution value reaches the optimal value, can it get better service qualities from the system. Analyses prove that this incentive model does have some incentive effects to P2P network and avoids the Free-Rider problem effectively, with this mechanism the sound development of P2P systems can be ensured to certain extent.
分 类 号:TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]
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