跨流域调水利益冲突的博弈研究——以南水北调中线陕西水源区和北京市为例  

Game theory on conflict of inter-basin water transfer:An example of Shaanxi water district and Beijing

作　　者：党志良[1] 孙健[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学西北水资源与环境生态教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710048

出　　处：《西北大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第2期332-334,347,共4页Journal of Northwest University（Natural Science Edition）

基　　金：陕西省水土保持局科研基金资助项目(2007-06-11)

摘　　要：目的探讨南水北调中线受水区(北京市)和陕西水源区的利益冲突。方法建立博弈论模型,分析博弈双方的利益。结果在2009—2015年,北京市和陕西3市在合作情况下,整体利益增加5 299.72亿元,而在非合作情况下,整体利益损失5 299.72亿元。结论北京市对陕西3市进行补偿,而陕西3市减少废水排放,保证水源水质,在这样的合作情况下才能使整体利益最大。Aim Disussion on the water conflicts between Beijing and Shaanxi water district.Methods Analyze the benefits by game theory model.Results The addition of overall benefits were 5 299.72 billion Yuan in the cooperative case,the loss were 5 299.72 billion Yuan in the non-cooperative case during the 2009—2015.Conclusion The overall benefits were largest in the cooperative case which Beijing compensated for three cities,and three cities reduced wastewater to ensure water quality.

关 键 词：南水北调中线工程 博弈论 生态补偿 

分 类 号：TV213[水利工程—水文学及水资源]