基于奖惩函数的非对称信息委托代理博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Agency Transaction Based on Asymmetric Information of the Penalty Function

作　　者：王尚户[1] 唐俊[1] 李玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古科技大学数理与生物工程学院,内蒙古包头014010

出　　处：《内蒙古大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第5期575-579,共5页Journal of Inner Mongolia University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：科技部创新方法专项资助(项目编号:2009IM010400)

摘　　要：委托代理本身存在诸多信息不对称、不确定的因素和风险,委托代理双方必须考虑风险的控制和利益的平衡.基于委托人拟支付代理人的工资总额按代理人的名义产出确定,引进奖惩机制遏制代理人的败德行为,运用博弈论中委托代理理论建立了非对称信息下委托-代理模型.并得出给定条件下的最优合同.Agency transaction contains various asymmetric information, uncertain factors and risks. Therefore,the both sides of an agency transaction concerned must consider the risk control and interest balance. A certain model is established,in which the customer is supposed to pay the agent according to the desirable output and an award and penalty system is adopted to prevent the agent＇s misbehaviour. This agency model with asymmetric information applied the relative theory of agency transaction involved in game theory and the optimal contract can be made in the given conditlon.

关 键 词：委托代理 非对称信息 奖惩函数 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]