论有限责任公司的债权人保护——以公司债权人介入公司治理的自我救济为导向  

The Protection of Creditor in Limited Company——Considering the Creditor's Involving into Corporation Management for Self-help

作　　者：林恩伟[1] 马效军[1] 

机构地区：[1]宁波大学,浙江宁波315211

出　　处：《安徽广播电视大学学报》2010年第3期22-26,共5页Journal of Anhui Radio & TV University

基　　金：宁波大学2010年度研究生科研创新基金项目

摘　　要：传统有限责任公司制度对债权人保护具有间接性,存在反射性利益保护的局限,其根本原因在于忽视公司债权人契约性权力的控制权配置可能。借助对债权人介入公司治理的契约性权力的合理性分析,可以清楚地揭示公司控制权的动态结构。基于状态依存所有权理论生发的相机治理理论,通过对不同经营状态下剩余控制权应然归属的确认,为债权人参与公司治理提供了正当理据。据此,公司法框架下的债权人介入行使控制权的具体路径可以表述为:(1)明确规定债权人与公司有关控制权合同条款的合理性;(2)建立普遍的公司债权人会议制度;(3)建立适合的监督履约机制;(4)明确规定公司濒临或处于破产阶段时的债转股制度。The protection of creditor in traditional limited liability system is indirect and passive. The reason comes from the neglect of creditor＇s right endowed by contract to deal with company affairs. By analyzing the rationality of contractual power when creditor involves in corporation, we can recognize the dynamic structure of corporation control. The contingent governance which comes from state-contingent ownership, through certification of control power, supplies creditor a rational method to involve in corporation management. Therefore, the exercise of creditor＇s control power under Company Law can be expressed as： （1） to clarify contract terms about the relationship between creditor and company; （2） to establish the creditor meeting system in general; （3） to establish the mechanisms of monitoring compliance system; （4） to define the assignment of debt when company is bankrupt or in the verge of bankruptcy.

关 键 词：有限责任 自主性债权人 契约性权力 利益相关者 相机治理 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]