审计师选择、信号传递和资本结构优化调整——基于中国上市公司的实证分析  

Auditor Selection,Signal Transmission and Optimization of Capital Structure:An Empirical Research on the Listed Companies in China

作　　者：张娟[1] 李虎[2] 王兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学中国审计研究中心,江苏南京210093 [2]南京大学管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2010年第5期33-39,共7页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY057)

摘　　要：我国上市公司的审计师选择行为是否具有信号传递作用?这对推动我国审计师行业发展和扩大独立审计的市场需求基础十分重要。通过2001年至2006年的面板数据分析发现,我国上市公司选择大规模审计师,能向市场传递利好信号,加快公司资本结构优化调整速度。国有上市公司和民营上市公司的审计师选择具有不同的边际效应,为促进资本结构优化调整,民营上市公司对国内"十大"审计师的需求更显著。Does the auditor selection have the function of transmitting signals on the Chinese capital market？ The answer is important to the development of the auditing industry and the expansion of the market demanding basis for independent audit. After analyzing the panel data from the year 2001 to 2006 ,we find the listed companies can transfer different signals to the market by selecting different auditors of qualifications, hence affecting the optimization of the capital structures. And the auditor selection of state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises have different marginal effects on their capital structure, the demand for local large scale auditors by the privateowned enterprises is more significant.

关 键 词：审计师选择 信号传递 资本结构 优化调整 上市公司 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]