出口促进战略:基于参与者偏好的分析  

Export Promotion Strategy:An Analysis of the Participants' Preferences

作　　者：郐军[1] 孙金鹏[2] 

机构地区：[1]烟台职业学院,山东烟台264670 [2]广东外语外贸大学南国商学院,广东广州510545

出　　处：《西北师大学报（社会科学版）》2010年第5期119-124,共6页Journal of Northwest Normal University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：出口促进战略的成功实施,取决于参与者偏好的满足程度,但出口的扩张及其效应所产生的反身性却侵蚀了这一基础。出口促进战略的初期目标是赚取急需的外汇,农民工、厂商和政府从各自的偏好出发,实现了合作博弈;当出口成为GDP的主要增长力量时,在出口价格内生化和汇率管制的条件下,它的高速增长是以福利损失和资源耗费为代价的,在三者博弈的进程中,政府成为赢家,厂商处于进退两难的境地,而农民工只是扮演着体能输出者的角色;随着高额的外汇储备的累积,由此引发的通货膨胀和人民币升值的双重压力使得依赖低廉劳动力成本的出口促进战略难以为继。政府主导的出口促进战略演变的是"初吉终退"的过程。The implementation of export promotion strategy depends on the satisfaction of the participants＇ preference,but reflexivity of it from expansion of exports and its effects erode the foundation eventually.At the initial stage,the goal is only for the foreign exchange with the small scale,and the farm laborers,the firms and the government have played cooperation games.But when the exports become the main growth strength of GDP,on the conditions of the endogenous prices and the pegged exchange rate,the exports growth has actually taken the welfare loss and net resource depletion as the cost.In the three-party game,the government becomes the winner,the firms in a dilemma and the farmers are actually playing the resources exporter role,then the dual pressures from inflation and the Renminbi appreciation,which makes the export promotion strategy dependent on low labor costs be unworkable any more.

关 键 词：贸易战略 参与者偏好 钉住汇率制 反身性 

分 类 号：F71[经济管理—产业经济]