终极控制权、法律环境与公司财务风险——来自我国民营上市公司的证据  

Ultimate Controlling Rights,Legal Environment and Corporate Financial Risk—Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies

作　　者：苏坤[1,2] 张俊瑞[1,2] 杨淑娥[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安交通大学过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710049 [3]上海对外贸易学院金融管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2010年第5期80-87,共8页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07BJY025);国家自然科学基金项目(70672054)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：以我国2004-2008年民营上市公司为研究对象,从终极控制人的视角,研究了终极控制权、法律环境及其相互作用对公司财务风险的影响。研究表明:终极控制股东现金流权与公司财务风险负相关。终极控制股东控制权与现金流权的分离加重了其对上市公司进行"掏空"获取私有收益的行为,加重了公司财务风险,两权分离程度与公司财务风险正相关。较高的地区法治水平能够有效遏制控股股东的"掏空"行为,上市公司所处的法律环境越好,其财务风险就越小。法律环境的改善不仅有助于直接降低公司财务风险,还有助于减轻由终极控制股东两权分离所导致的财务风险。By analyzing a corporate-level dataset of Chinese private listed companies through 2004-2008 from the perspective of the ultimate controller,this paper investigates the influence of ultimate controlling shareholder,legal environment and their interaction on corporate financial risk.The results indicate that ultimate controlling shareholders' cash flow rights are negatively related to corporate financial risk,that the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights increases the tunneling behaviors of getting private benefits and increases corporate financial risk,that the divergence is positively related to corporate financial risk.Good legal environment can effectively prevent the controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviors and reduce corporate financial risk.The improvement of legal environment helps reduce not only the corporate financial risk,but also the financial risk resulted from the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders' controlling rights and cash flow rights.

关 键 词：终极控制权 法律环境 财务风险 现金流权 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学] F275[政治法律—法学]