重申个人自主性:概念修正与规范建构  

Reclaiming Individual Autonomy:Conceptual Revision and Normative Construction

作　　者：刘擎[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学中国现代思想文化研究所,上海200241

出　　处：《学术月刊》2010年第9期49-57,共9页Academic Monthly

基　　金：上海重点学科建设项目(项目编号B406)的资助

摘　　要：个人自主性是现代社会的核心理念之一,在近代启蒙理性主义的思想传统中得到张扬。理性是一种抽象的形式化能力,它在实践中的运用是对各种具体理由作出回应,但理性本身无法创造出实质性的理由。如果完全依靠人的理性能力来寻求"自我立法",那终将陷入无以自立的困境。从关系性的角度来重新理解个人的构成与自主性的概念,为克服启蒙理性主义的局限开放了新的可能。其核心论旨主张,个人与社会、历史和文化的诸种关系是实现个人自主性所依据的条件和资源。恰当理解的个人自主性,揭示了"原子化的个人"与"放任个人主义"的认知错误,为抑制价值规范上的主观任意性与极端怀疑论提供了可能。这一概念修正与规范重建的努力,通过清理自主性得以实现的条件和前提来重申这一理想,有助于复苏和强化它所蕴涵的道德与价值的规范力量,以此来抵御对现代性观念的误解和攻击,对于克服现代性困境的论题具有启发意义。Individual autonomy is a core idea of modernity. By clarifying the misconception of individual autonomy shaped by Kantian rationalism, the paper points out the necessity of reformu-lating the concept as a relational one, which emphasizes the importance of the individual＇s relations to society, history and culture as the conditions and resources for achieving autonomy. Individual autonomy properly understood in the relational term, as the author argues, exposes cognitive mistakes of ＂atomistic individual＂ and ＂hyper-individualism＂ and renders the potential of restoring the normative implications of autonomy for morality and values. This would inspire a new approach to understanding the problem of modernity.

关 键 词：个人自主性 价值规范 现代性 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]