垂直结构下征收最优反倾销税的动态博弈分析  

Dynamic game analysis of best anti-dumping duties under vertical structure

作　　者：王平[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第6期762-766,共5页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：建立垂直产业结构经济模型,而后运用利润最大化以及动态博弈的方法进行分析,最终得出结论.从企业的微观角度考虑,分析影响上下游企业利润的因素,并分析如何通过控制这些影响因素提高企业利润.从国家的角度考虑,为了取得本国福利的最大化,在对进口中间产品与最终产品征收反倾销税时,分析本国以及外国的上下游厂商的成本与最优反倾销税的关系,如何根据不同成本结构制定对中间产品、最终产品征收的最优反倾销税税率,达到社会福利的最大化,以期为政府决策如何对不同行业征收最优税率以提高本国社会福利,提供参考依据.In this paper, a vertical structure of economic model is set up first, and the profits maximizing and the dynamic game are applied to obtain the ultimate conclusion. On one hand, from the micro view of the enterprise, the impact on both the up stream and down stream firms is analyzed to get the method of controlling these factors to increase their profits. On the other hand, from the view of government, in order to achieve the maximization of national welfare, how to analyze the relationship between the best anti-dumping duties and the cost of both the domestic and foreign upstream and downstream manufacturers, and sets a best collection of anti-dumping tax rate on intermediate products and final products according to the different cost structure of them is discussed, so as to provide suggestions on government’s decision-making on the optimal tax rate levied in different industries.

关 键 词：中间产品 动态博弈 反倾销税 垂直市场结构 产量领导 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]