现金流权不一致、利益冲突与控制权阶段转移  

Inconsistent cash flow rights,conflicts of benefit and transfer of control rights in stage

作　　者：王声凑[1] 曾勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2010年第9期76-86,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70540022);高校博士点基金资助项目(200806140016)

摘　　要：基于不完全合约理论,考虑风险投资者和创业者现金流权不一致所导致的双方利益冲突,在阶段投资框架下分析风险投资者在各个阶段的阶段决策,以及双方在阶段投资时刻对现金流权和控制权的再谈判,进而揭示控制权在不同阶段的转移过程及其影响因素.研究结果表明,阶段投资时刻项目的业绩较好,风险投资者将继续投资并向创业者释放控制权;进一步,项目发展前景的初始预期越好以及第2阶段不确定性越小,风险投资者在阶段投资时刻越倾向于继续投资及释放控制权.研究结论解释了Kaplan和Strmberg关于控制权动态转移与项目不确定性、业绩关系的实证结果.This paper analyzes the conflicts of benefit between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs because of their inconsistent cash flow rights.We apply the framework of incomplete contracts to discuss venture capitalists＇ stages investment decisions,renegotiations and the transfer of control rights in the framework of stage investment.It is shown that,when the performance of the first stage is good,the venture capitalist will continue to invest in the project and release the control rights to the entrepreneurs.The better the performance of the first stage and the smaller the uncertainty of the second stage,the more likely the venture capitalist will continue to invest in the project and release the control rights to the entrepreneurs.The results provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidences of Kaplan and Strmberg about the dynamic allocation of control rights in venture investment contracts.

关 键 词：不完全合约 阶段投资 可转换证券 再谈判 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] F224.32