基于演化博弈的发电企业二氧化碳排放市场交易机制创新  

The Market trading Mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Emissions of Power Plants Based on Evolutionary Game Innovation Research

作　　者：李海锋[1] 孙睿[1] 任玉珑[1] 林鉴军[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程》2010年第7期56-60,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70903080)

摘　　要：设计一种鼓励发电企业减少二氧化碳排放量的二氧化碳排放期权交易市场。在该市场中,允许政府、公众、发电企业三方通过期权市场交易二氧化碳排放期权合约;借助演化博弈理论分析发电企业、公众、政府之间相互博弈的过程。结论表明:只要期望收益大于平均收益,他们之间的演化博弈过程就会继续下去。在这个过程中,存在这样一个改善环境质量的演化均衡策略(ESS)(即所有的发电企业采用环保技术和和设备来减少二氧化碳的排放量)。This paper designs a market of operation trade of Carbon Dioxide Emissions in order to motivate the power companies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,allowing the government,the public and power plants to trade the Carbon Dioxide Emissions Bonds through the market.Based on the evolutionary game,we analyze the game among the power plants,the public and government.The conclusion shows that,if the expected return is greater than the average earnings,the process of evolutionary game among them will continue.In the process,there exists a balance of evolution strategy to improve the environmental quality,that is,all of the power plants use the environmentally friendly technologies and equipments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

关 键 词：发电企业 二氧化碳排放期权交易 演化博弈 创新研究 

分 类 号：F407[经济管理—产业经济]