农村金融放松管制的动力机制——基于国家效用函数的分析  

The Power Mechanism of Rural Finance Deregulation:An Analysis Based on the National Utility Function

作　　者：刘纯彬[1] 桑铁柱[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济系

出　　处：《财经科学》2010年第10期34-40,共7页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：现有关于农村金融放松管制的研究多集中于对策层面。本文通过构建国家放松农村金融管制的效用函数,分析我国农村金融放松管制的动力机制。研究表明,在转轨经济中,当影响国家效用函数最大化的约束因素突破国家承受底线,进而降低国家效用时,国家会做出放松管制的决策。随着转轨经济的完成,国家效用函数会从租金偏好转为效率偏好,这会带来进一步的放松管制,以提升农村金融效率。The existing studies about rural finance deregulation are more focus on the measures.In this paper,we build a national utility function of rural finance regulation,and then study the power mechanism of rural finance deregulation.We find that,in transition economy,when the maximization of the utility function constraints break the national bear bottom line,reduce the national utility,the State will make deregulation decisions.When the transition economy is completed,the state utility function will prefer efficiency to rent,and this will lead to further deregulation.Thus,we should give more deregulation of the rural financial markets and improve the efficiency of rural finance.

关 键 词：农村金融 放松管制 国家效用函数 动力机制 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]