基于控制权利益的企业并购支付合约选择模型  

A Model Study on the Choice of Payment Contract in Enterprises Mergers and Acquisitions from the Perspective of Private Benefits of Control

作　　者：李双燕[1] 万迪昉[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院 [2]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2010年第10期1553-1557,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572039);西安交通大学"985"工程2期资助项目(07200701)

摘　　要：构建了企业并购支付合约选择理论模型,从并购方控股股东角度出发考察在有控制权利益的情形下,企业对不同支付合约的偏好,包括现金、股票和现金加股票3种合约形式。研究发现,控制权利益的存在可以获得一个现金加股票的最优合约均衡解。在此基础上,模型分析了并购方控股股东持股比例、股权制衡度、目标方股权集中度、相对交易规模和行业关联度对并购企业合约选择偏好产生的影响:一方面,并购方控股股东出于对当前控制权利益的保护,对现金支付合约有明显偏好;另一方面,并购方出于对未来风险的规避,对股票支付合约有明显偏好。模型结论弥补了仅从实证角度研究的不足。This paper constructs a model of the choice of payment contract in mergers and acquisitions（MA） and studies enterprises＇ attitude toward how to choose payment contract,which include cash,stocks and a combination of cash and stock from the perspective of controlling shareholder.The results show that there exists an equilibrium solution of a combination of cash and stocks under the condition of private benefits of control.This model demonstrates how the shareholding,the balance of power,shares centralization,relative deal size and the correlation of industry have effect on the preference of payment contract.We found out that controlling shareholder of acquirers has preferences to cash payment contract to protect private benefits of control and preferences to stock payment contract to avoid future risks.

关 键 词：并购 控制权利益 支付合约 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]