业主支付担保的博弈论分析  

Game Theory Analysis with Employer Payment Bond

作　　者：郑梅华[1] 张云波[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学土木工程学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2010年第5期837-840,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

摘　　要：针对近年来房地产开发企业拖欠工程款现象严重,导致承包商无力支付农民工工资,进而严重影响社会稳定的问题,国家推出了业主支付担保制度。运用博弈论,从政府和业主、担保机构和业主的博弈关系角度出发,研究业主支付担保制度实行的有效性。通过建立监管模型,分析在何种情况下,政府、担保机构对业主进行监管、监控最为有效,达到既能防止业主违约现象的发生,又能最大限度地减少人力、财力和物力的损失。In recent years,the phenomenon of the project payment procrastination caused by the estate development company is becoming more seriously.It makes contractors unable to pay the peasant workers and then causes the society instability.So,the government pushed a new system which is called employer payment bond.The game theory was employed to analyze the validity of employer payment bond from the angle of the game relationship between the government and the owner and relationship between the insurance company and the owner.Intendance game model was established to analyze that under what condition,the government and the insurance company can have effective supervision over the owner.Then it can stop the owner breaking promise,and it can therefore minimize the loss of manpower,money and the physical resource.

关 键 词：工程支付 业主支付担保 监管博弈 

分 类 号：TU71[建筑科学—建筑技术科学] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]