经济适用房准入管理政策的激励机制设计与实证分析  

Incentive mechanism designing of access management policy for affordable housing and its case analysis

作　　者：张建坤[1] 陈森发[2] 周雷[3] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学土木工程学院,南京210096 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096 [3]技术大学建筑信息研究所,奥地利格拉茨

出　　处：《东南大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第5期1115-1120,共6页Journal of Southeast University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BJY042)

摘　　要：就当前经济适用房认购对象出现错位;部分申请者谎报、瞒报家庭收入骗取经济适用房购买权;经济适用房准入政策不严密等状况,采用激励机制设计理论,通过对现行经济适用房准入管理政策的分析,构建激励相容的机制模型.在对北京市家庭进行实证分析的基础上,对现行经济适用房准入机制进行完善,并得出保证申请者真实申报前提下的政府最大效用值.政府在制定经济适用房准入政策时,不仅要准确把握政策目标,而且要深入了解在追求最大利益的个人理性驱使下,人们将选择怎样的行动,从而提高政策制定与调控的准确性.In view of the dislocation problems of the access to affordable housing,that is,some applicants give false information or hide the truth about household income in order to gain the purchase right of affordable housing,a scientific and incentive compatibility mechanism model is built by analyzing the current admittance management policy of affordable housing based on the incentive mechanism theory.And then through the demonstration analysis of Beijing family,the government maximal utility value is got when the precondition of applicant＇s truly applying is guaranteed.When the government makes policy,it should not only grasp the policy object,but also have a deep understanding of the driving of individual rationality for pursuing the best interests and what action people would choose.Thus the policy making and adjusting would be more accurate and scientific.

关 键 词：机制设计 经济适用房 政策 信息非对称性 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32