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作 者:蔡景浩[1]
机构地区:[1]河北经贸大学会计学院,河北石家庄050061
出 处:《贵州商业高等专科学校学报》2010年第3期11-14,共4页Journal of Guizhou Commercial College
摘 要:现行公司治理普遍采用公司业绩作为管理层努力的代理变量,而会计盈余又往往成为衡量公司业绩的主要指标。这为管理人员作为会计政策选择的主体利用政策选择操控利润来提高自身报酬提供了机会。公司管理层选择会计政策的动机和管理层如何对新发布的会计准则做出反应向来备受关注,2006年的企业会计准则改革扩大了公允价值的运用,为以薪酬操纵为目的会计政策选择提供了更广阔的空间。在此背景下,考察公允价值在管理层薪酬契约中的作用显然具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。The current corporate governances universally adopt company performance as a proxy for managers' efforts and accounting surplus has often become the main indicator to measure company performance,which provides an opportunity for managers to improve their own remuneration.These managers are the subjects who take advantage of choosing management policies to manipulate profit.It has always been paid great attention to the managers' motives of choosing accounting policies and to how their response to the new accounting standards.In 2006,the business accounting standards reform expanded the use of the fair value,which offered larger space to choose accounting policies based on the salary manipulation.In this context,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to examine the role of the fair value in the manager salary's contract.
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