资产专用性、机会主义行为与纵向一体化--基于中澳铁矿石价格谈判的实证研究  

Asset Specificity,Opportunism Behavior and Vertical Integration——The Empirical Study on the Basis of the Negotiation of Iron Ore Prices between China and Australia

作　　者：陈博[1] 于同申[1] 

机构地区：[1]陈博中国人民大学经济学院,北京 100872

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2010年第10期109-114,共6页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“贯彻落实科学发展观与深化垄断行业改革--大型国有垄断企业的治理结构和政府规制结构研究”(07&ZD015)资助

摘　　要：本文从企业理论的角度解读中澳铁矿石价格谈判的困局,并通过博弈模型的建立和分析阐释资产专用性、机会主义行为与纵向一体化三者的逻辑关系,进而探析中澳谈判背后的经济学原理,为我国在铁矿石价格谈判中掌握主动权提供一些政策建议。This paper studies the negotiation predicament of iron ore prices between China and Australia with enterprise the- ory, and then explains the relationship among asset specificity, opportunism behavior and vertical integration by establishing and analyzing a game model. We furtherly explore the principles of economics of the negotiation between China and Australia in order to provide some policy suggestions for our country to seize the initiative in the negotiation of iron ore prices.

关 键 词：资产专用性 机会主义行为 纵向一体化 博弈 

分 类 号：F74[经济管理—国际贸易]