Asymmetric Information in Combating Terrorism: Is the Threat Just a Bluff?  

作　　者：张婧 申世飞 杨锐 

机构地区：[1]Center for Public Safety Research, Department of Engineering Physics, Tsinghua University

出　　处：《Tsinghua Science and Technology》2010年第5期604-612,共9页清华大学学报（自然科学版（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the Key Technologies Research and DevelopmentProgram of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan of China (No 2006BAK04A08)

摘　　要：This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.

关 键 词：asymmetric information COUNTER-TERRORISM risk assessment sequential game resource allocation 

分 类 号：D815.5[政治法律—国际关系]