对上市公司信用缺失的剖析——基于博弈理论的分析  

Game Analysis of the Listed Companies' Credit——Research based on Game theory

作　　者：欧阳祖友[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学财经学院会计系

出　　处：《财务与金融》2010年第5期84-88,共5页Accounting and Finance

摘　　要：上市公司信用一直以来都是倍受人们关注的问题。本文运用不完全信息动态博弈的方法对上市公司信用问题进行分析。建立并求解一个KMRW声誉模型,得出以下结论:在满足一定的约束条件下且博弈重复的次数足够长,对于高信息成本投资者,其与上市公司博弈的结果收敛于不合作;而对于低信息成本投资者,上市公司选择遵守承诺,投资者继续投资,是一个"精炼贝叶斯均衡"。Public has concerned on the credit of the listed companies for many years.This paper analyzes the credit of the listed companies by using dynamic game of incomplete information.On the base of establishing and solving the KMRW model,we draw the conclusion that：if certain constraints can be met and the number of times of repeating game is large enough,the high cost information investors will not cooperate with the listed companies,but the low cost information investors will corporate with the listed companies.

关 键 词：上市公司信用 博弈分析 精炼贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]