股权集中度与证券市场的倒U型内幕交易曲线  

Ownership Concentration and the Inverse U-shaped Insider Trading Curve

作　　者：姜华东[1] 乔晓楠[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院金融学院,上海201620 [2]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《上海金融》2010年第10期7-13,共7页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：本文从上市公司股权集中度的视角研究证券市场内幕交易行为,通过对信息的产权分析,提出了倒U型的内幕交易曲线。实证研究也发现,随着股权集中度的逐渐增加,上市公司内幕交易的严重程度也会相应增加。然而,当股权高度集中时,第一大股东制衡机制将发挥作用,内幕交易严重程度会有所减轻。内幕交易严重程度与股权集中度总体上呈现出倒U型曲线关系。这个结果也为内幕交易监管确定了重点的监管范围,能有效提高监管效率并节省监管成本。Ownership concentration of listed companies is closely related to insider trading.Using information property right theory,we advance a theoretic hypothesis of inverse U-shaped insider trading curve.Empirical study also shows that when the ownership concentration increased,the insider trading increased.But a high ownership concentration will help reduce insider trading.The largest stockholder will protect the insider information and prevent insider trading.The result can improve the efficiency and save costs of regulation.

关 键 词：股权集中度 内幕交易 信息产权 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]