我国证券投资基金管理人信赖义务的理论分析  

Theoretical Analysis of the Fiduciary Duty of the Securities Investment Fund's Manager

作　　者：陈士林[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学法学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《上海金融》2010年第10期88-91,共4页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：证券投资基金管理人与持有人之间存在信息不对称的,基金管理人为追求个人利益会出现道德风险、逆向选择等问题。为了强化基金治理,消除基金管理人和持有人之间的利益冲突,必须加强我国基金管理人信赖义务理论的研究,构建以信赖义务为核心的基金管理人监管制度。基金管理人信赖义务在内涵上,信赖义务是信托义务在基金制度中的应用与体现;在内容上,基金管理人信赖义务分为注意义务与忠实义务,两者既相互独立,又相辅相成;在性质上,信赖义务是区别于物权说和债权说的一种新的义务形态,是基于安全、效率价值平衡而创设的;在法律规制方面,建议保留诚信原则的规定,同时引入信赖义务来规范基金管理人的行为,从而实现基金当事人的权利义务平衡。Securities investment fund has the asymmetric information problem between fund managers and holders,thus may cause adverse selection and moral hazard when fund managers pursuit personal interest.In order to strengthen fund governance and eliminate conflicts between fund managers and owners,we must strengthen the theoretical research of fund managers＇s fiduciary duty and build fund manager supervision system with fiduciary duty as the core.In meaning,fiduciary duty is the application and embodiment of trust obligation in fund system.In content,fund manager＇s fiduciary duty is divided into the duty of care and the duty of loyalty,which are distinct but also complementary.In nature,fiduciary duty is a new form of obligation,which is different from the property theory and the debt theory,and is created based on the value balance between safety and efficiency.In the legal regulation,we propose to retain the principle of good faith,and import the concept of fiduciary duty to regulate fund managers to achieve balance between fund managers and holders.

关 键 词：证券投资基金 管理人 信赖义务 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]