闭环供应链中新件制造商和再制造商的价格及质量水平竞争  

Price and Quality Competition Between the New and Remanufactured Producer in the Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：曹俊[1,2] 熊中楷[1] 刘莉莎[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆科技学院管理学院,重庆401331 [3]重庆科技学院数理系,重庆401331

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第5期82-90,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871125);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571088);重庆市自然科学基金(cstc.2006BB0188)

摘　　要：综合考虑新件与再制造件的质量水平之间的内在关系、新件对再制造件的数量限制、以及不同消费者的价格敏感性差异的基础上,本文通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,采用单一的成本函数簇探讨了新件制造商和再制造商同时进入存在消费转移的市场后,如何进行质量和价格竞争,从而实现各自的利润最大化。本文还给出了新件制造商的均衡利润存在下限的充分条件。Considering the relationship of quality level,quantity constrained,and consumers with heterogeneous price sensitivity,and based on the two stages dynamic game model,we use a single cost function class to study the price and quality competition between the manufacturer and remanufacturer under free recycling model in the closed-loop supply chain.The results indicate that when the remanufacturerd product enters the market at the same,the manufacturer has the largest profit in the event of the largest quality gap.We obtain the sufficient condition under which the remanufacturer has a lower limit equilibrium profit.

关 键 词：动态博弈 闭环供应链 价格竞争 质量竞争 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]