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机构地区:[1]哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001
出 处:《中国管理科学》2010年第5期98-105,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70601009;70890084)
摘 要:搜索引擎关键字广告是一种新兴的获得巨大成功的在线营销方式。本文分析了搜索引擎广告位的拍卖规则,给出了在质量因子因素下,广告主的竞价行为。首先给出了广告主单阶段同时行动的竞价均衡,在该情况下,广告主单独竞价选择对自己最有利的策略;其次给出了多阶段情况下,给定一个广告主的最小加价策略,另外一个广告主的最优策略,并给出了相关的证明;最后用实际观测到的数据对该策略进行验证。另外还给出了三个相关的推论,该推论对于搜索引擎如何提高自己的收益有一定的指导意义。Sponsored search is a new online marketing method that achieves great success in recent years.In this paper,we analyze different auction mechanisms used by search engines,and present the bidding behaviors of advertisers in the condition that quality score is implemented.We first examine a single period and simultaneous move game,and show that in this game,both advertisers choose their best strategies without considering their opponents' policy.Then,we consider a multi-period game.In this game,we provide and prove an optimal strategy for advertisers given their opponent using a minimum outbidding strategy.The proposed strategy is verified by empirical data.Besides,we propose three related corollaries that are meaningful to search engines.
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