寡头发电商投资阈值与容量选择模型及其分析  

The Model for Investment Threshold and Capacity Choice and Its Analysis in Oligopoly Generation Power Market

作　　者：张新华[1,2] 赖明勇[2] 叶泽[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114 [2]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第5期106-112,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70971012);国家杰出青年科学基金(70925006);中国博士后科学基金第二批特别资助(200902470);湖南省高校创新平台开放基金项目(10K002)

摘　　要：发电容量投资不足或过剩都将带来巨大经济与社会损失。论文针对不确定需求下的电力市场,在分析了容量约束下的寡头发电商竞价策略基础上,运用实物期权和博弈论思想,构建了寡头发电投资阈值与容量选择模型,并通过数值仿真给出了投资商的投资阈值与最优投资容量,分析结果表明:1)随投资商数量的增加,投资阈值下降,但最优的投资容量也随之下降;若需求不确定性增大,投资阈值与最优容量则随之增大;2)就整个电力市场而言,在发电商数量比较少时,电力市场效率较低,但电力供给充裕;而在发电商数量较多时,市场效率较高,但电力供给却较为紧张。The excess or shortage of generation power capacity investment will lead to huge economic and social losses.In the paper,on the basis of bidding equilibrium of power producers,the model for investment threshold and capacity choice under uncertain power demand is presented,with real option and game theory.Then,the optimal investment threshold and capacity of investors are displayed by numerical simulation.The results indicate that,1） the investment threshold and optimal capacity are decreasing with the amount of investors,but increasing with the uncertainty of power demand;2） to the whole power market,when the amount of power investors is smaller,the market efficiency is lower,but power supply is more adequate.

关 键 词：实物期权 博弈论 投资阈值 容量选择 电力市场 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]