我国医生行为违规的制度分析  

An institutional analysis of the doctors' rule-breaking behavior in China

作　　者：张录法[1] 周朝民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2010年第5期96-100,共5页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：教育部社科研究项目(06JC630019);上海市哲学社科规划课题(2006BJB020);国家社科基金项目(06BZZ031)

摘　　要：医生在卫生行业中具有双重的身份,所以很容易行为违规,而不同医患制度安排中所蕴含的激励和约束机制又是造成医生违规的基础。本文利用博弈模型证明了我国医患之间现有制度安排的弊端,在此基础上提出了基于激励的新制度安排——"社区‘看门人’制度",该制度利用医患重复博弈和医疗费用的预付等机制,给予了医生正当的激励和更加有效的监督约束,从而减弱了医生违规的动机,并激发了其提高效率的内在动力。The doctor plays a dual role in the health industry so that they may easily break the rule. The system arrangement between the physician and patient is the base of physician＇s rule-breaking behavior. This paper proved the invalidation of the present system arrangement between the physician and patient with game model, then, this paper put forward a new system arrangement between the doctor and patient which can give normal incentive and more effective supervision to the doctor by repeated game between the doc- tor and patient and the prepayment mechanism, weakening the doctor＇s motivation and stimulating their internal motive to improve the efficiency.

关 键 词：医生 违规 激励 重复博弈 “社区'看门人’制度” 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]