委托-代理模型在农业保险中的应用及修正  

The Application and Modification of Delegation-Agent Model in Agricultural Insurance

作　　者：薛海连[1] 张海霞[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学理学院,陕西杨凌712100 [2]太原科技大学数学系,山西太原030024

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2010年第28期16007-16008,共2页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

摘　　要：建立了信息对称时的农业保险中的委托-代理模型和信息不对称时的委托-代理模型,在信息对称时,保险人按照一阶最优条件来选择努力水平a;当信息不对称时,一阶最优条件改变,产出越高,投保人的收入越高。并对模型进行修正,修正后,信息对称时,保险人通过修正后的一阶最优条件来确定投保人的努力水平;信息不对称时,模型的一阶最优条件也相应改变。结果表明,当努力成本函数与投保人(农业生产者)的期望效用相关联时,保险人与投保人能达到双赢:若投保人更加认真管理保险标的,就会降低灾害的发生率,从而减少了保险公司对投保人的理赔,增加了保险公司的收益。The Delegation-agent models in agricultural assurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and in- formation asymmetry. Insurers choose effort level a according to the excellent condition at the present stage when the information is symmet- ric. While the information is asymmetric, the most excellent condition changed. In other words, the higher the production, the insured are getting more and more benefits. The paper also modifies the models, when the information is symmetric, the insurers choose the effort level of the insured a＂ based on the modified present excellent condition to the contrary, the excellent condition would change. The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured. If the insured manage the insuring objects, the rate of disasters would be lowered. Therefore, the insurance claimed against the insured, would be lessened, and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.

关 键 词：农业保险 委托-代理模型 道德风险 修正 

分 类 号：F333.89[经济管理—产业经济]