上下游企业相似商品的最优反倾销税率模型  

The Optimal Anti-dumping Tax Rate Model of Upstream and Downstream Enterprises' Heterogeneous Products Ttrade

作　　者：邬一欣[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2010年第11期155-157,共3页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：作为政府的重要决策,反倾销税率一直被学术界广泛研究。文章基于两国存在上下游企业相似商品贸易的假设,建立了在完全信息静态博弈下的反倾销税率定价优化模型。通过Cournot-Nash均衡以及逆向归纳法,发现了优化的反倾销税率与市场的容量,商品相关性以及国外上下游企业的边际成本这四个因素有关,但与本国上下游企业的边际成本无关。从而得出在成本变动或者市场容量变动的情况下,政府应如何制定反倾销税率来保证本国社会福利最大化。The anti-dumping tax rate, a crucial decision of government, is always regarded as a hot issue in the academic world. With the supposed heterogeneous products trade between upstream and downstream enterprises in two countries, this paper is targeted to establish an anti - dumping tax rate optimization model of pricing based on static games of complete information. Through the Cournot - Nash Equi- librium and backward induction, the market capacity, the correlation and the marginal cost of foreign upstream and downstream enterpri- ses, the four elements above, rather than the marginal cost of domestic upstream and downstream enterprises, are found tightly linked with the optimal anti - dumping tax rate. Therefore, on the case that international cost or the market capacity fluctuates, we come to a conclu- sion about how the government should adjust the anti -dumping tax rate to maximize social welfare.

关 键 词：反倾销税率 优化模型 Cournot—Nash均衡 完全信息静态博弈 

分 类 号：F140[经济管理—世界经济]