币值低估和投机性资本流入的演化模型  

A Currency Undervaluation and an Evolutionary Model of Speculative Capital Inflows

作　　者：彭明旭[1] 王有贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2010年第5期16-25,98,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

摘　　要：利用演化博弈模型分析了在币值低估和预期升值条件下,投机性资本流入的演化路径和均衡结构。研究表明:在确定性演化博弈中,投机性资本流入存在着两个均衡,即少数投机者选择投机或者全部投机者都选择投机,这些均衡依赖于其初始状态和收益函数;在随机性演化博弈中,只要存在尝试调整策略的学习过程,即使尝试调整的概率趋向于零,投机性资本流入的演化结果最终都只会收敛于一个长期均衡,并且这一均衡与经济基础密切相关。In this paper, the analyze author the evolutionary path and the equilibrium structure of the speculative capital inflows, under the condition of an undervalued currency and an expected appreciation within the framework of the evolutionary game. In the model of the deterministic evolutionary game, there exists two equilibriums of the speculative capital inflows, such as, a small number of speculative capital inflow or all do so, which depends on the initial state and their payoff function. In the model of the stochastic evolutionary game, the author introduce ＂learning by experimentation＂, and find that there is a unique equilibrium concerned about the speculative capital inflows, even if the probability of ＂learning by experimentation＂ approaches zero, which is closely related to the economic fundamentals.

关 键 词：演化博弈 投机性资本 货币升值 

分 类 号：F821.6[经济管理—财政学]