征地制度改革动态博弈分析  

Dynamic Game Analysis on Land Requisition System Reform

作　　者：李红波[1,2] 赵俊三[2] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学建筑工程学院,云南昆明650224 [2]昆明理工大学国土资源工程学院,云南昆明650093

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2010年第10期25-29,35,共6页China Land Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70573036);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790131);昆明理工大学引进人才科研启动基金项目(2007-44)

摘　　要：研究目的:剖析征地制度改革研究静态分析的缺陷,厘清征地制度主体之间的互动关系,理解和把握征地制度改革的动力和演绎路径。研究方法:文献资料法,收益—成本法,关系演绎图解法。研究结果:征地制度改革要得以推进,改革所产生的收益—成本要具体化为参与方利益集团的收益与成本之比较。研究结论:中央政府、地方政府和被征地农民三方各自追求效用收益极大、成本极小的互为因果的博弈行动驱动着征地制度改革的演进,演进方向应是创建Pareto改进的非零和博弈的规则。而参与改革三方的多阶段重复博弈决定了征地制度改革是一个渐进的动态发现过程。The purposes of this paper are that： （1）to explore the flaws of static analysis on land requisition system reform; （2）so as to figure out the interactions among main parties involved in land requisition; （3）understand the driving forces and grasp the evolution path of the reform. Methods employed are documentation, benefit-cost analysis, and graphical relation deduction. The results indicate that in order to accelerate the land requisition system reform, the benefit and cost of the reform should be concretized into the benefit-and-cost comparison among the involved parties. It is concluded： （ 1 ）based on the reciprocal causations of benefit-maximizing and cost-minimizing principles, it is found that the game actions of the central government, local governments and peasants in land requisition are the driving forces of land requisition system reform; （2）the evolution direction is forming the rule of a non-zero-sum game according to Pareto improvement;（ 3 ）the repeated multiple-stages game of the three parties in the reform determines the land requisition system reform is a gradual, dynamic and explorative nrocess.

关 键 词：土地管理 征地制度改革 动态博弈分析 收益-成本分析 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]