集团化、银行贷款与资金配置效率  

On the Business Group Affiliation,Bank Loans and Capital Allocation Efficiency

作　　者：潘红波[1] 余明桂[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院会计系,湖北武汉市430072

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第10期83-102,共20页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:70902052;70602013和70972090);教育部人文社科基金项目(项目批准号:09YJC630179);湖北省社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:[2009]006);武汉大学自主科研项目(项目批准号:09ZZKY078)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以1999～2005年深沪所有由独立公司变为集团成员公司的数据为样本,运用Heckman样本选择模型,研究集团化对公司银行贷款和资金配置效率的影响。结果发现,集团化能提高公司获得银行贷款担保的概率,可以帮助公司获得更多的银行贷款和更长的贷款期限。进一步的检验发现,集团化会导致公司的过度投资行为。这些研究结果表明,集团化能降低银行贷款的风险,进而增加公司的银行融资便利;控股股东会利用集团化公司的银行融资便利,进行过度投资以最大化自己的控制权私有收益,从而降低银行信贷资金的配置效率。就银监会的信贷政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,银监会有关单一企业和单一集团的差别贷款政策尽管可以降低银行贷款的风险,但同时也会降低银行信贷资金的配置效率,并可能会对单一企业的信贷资金产生挤出效应。This paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on corporate bank loans and capital allocation efficiency based on the dataset transforming from independent firms to business group affiliations from 1999 to 2005 and the Heckman＇s sample selection model. It is found that compared with those independent firms, business group affiliations are more likely to get the guarantee of bank loan and more and long-term bank loans. Moreover, business group affiliations are more likely to over-invest. These results indicate that the intra-group propping reduces the risk of bank loans, and thus bring preferential bank loans to business group affiliations; the controlling shareholder, in order to increase the private benefit of control, will require the business group affiliations with access to bank loans to over-invest, and subsequently decrease the capital allocation efficiency of bank loans. As to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the results suggest that the discriminative bank loans policy for the independent firms can reduce the risk of bank loans, but will decrease the capital allocation efficiency that may make it harder for independent firms to raise bank loans.

关 键 词：企业集团 银行贷款 担保 资金配置效率 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F272F224