制衡股东性质与制衡效果——来自中国民营化上市公司的经验证据  

Between the Nature of Shareholders in Power Balance and the Effect of Power Balance

作　　者：涂国前[1] 刘峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]厦门大学会计系

出　　处：《管理世界》2010年第11期132-142,共11页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"产权保护导向的会计控制研究"(70532003)最终成果的一部分

摘　　要：本文以中国国有控股上市公司民营化,并形成民营股东控股,但股权制衡结构不同的公司为样本,研究不同性质的制衡股东是否具有不同的制衡效果。本文发现,与一股独大公司相比,国有股东制衡公司更可能被民营控股股东掏空,民营股东制衡公司更不可能被民营控股股东掏空,说明不同性质的制衡股东具有不同的制衡效果。本文还发现,有政治关系的民营控股股东更可能掏空。Using as our sample China's state-owned and controlling listed companies that were privatized and whose shares were controlled by private shareholders but their structures of power balance in the share right differ,we have,in this paper,studied the problem of whether shareholders with the power balance and with different nature have different effect of the power balance.We have discovered that,compared with firms controlled by a single majority shareholder,state-owned companies with the structure of the power balance are more likely to be tunneled by private controlling shareholders,and that companies with private shareholders and with the structure of the power balance are more unlikely to be tunneled by private controlling shareholders,which facts show that shareholders,with different nature,of companies with the power balance have different effect of the power balance. We have also found that controlling shareholders with political connection are more likely to tunnel.

关 键 词：制衡股东 制衡效果 政治关系 掏空 民营化 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272