NTU模糊结盟对策的妥协值  

Comprise solution of fuzzy NTU-game

作　　者：张晓玲[1] 高作峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]金肯职业技术学院基础课部,江苏南京211156 [2]燕山大学理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第5期824-826,共3页Journal of Liaoning Technical University (Natural Science)

基　　金：河北省自然科学基金资助项目(A2005000301);河北省教育厅资助项目(2004468);金肯职业技术学院高等数学改革研究(JG0907)

摘　　要：为了使NTU模糊结盟对策的妥协值(τ值)能够更好的应用到现实的分配模型中,以模糊结盟为工具,以传统的τ值为基础,采用演绎推理的分析方法,定义了NTU凸模糊结盟对策的新的妥协值,并证明了该妥协值具有存在唯一性、个体合理性、有效性、对称性以及正仿射变换。结论表明该妥协值在形式上类似于τ值,但是具有τ值不满足的理性行为和合理性原则。In order to have the τ-value of fuzzy NTU-game applied in realistic models,the compromise solution of convex fuzzy NTU-game is defined using the method of syllogism. It is based on the coalition of fuzzy NTU-game and τ-value. The axioms and properties of the compromise solution are proved as uniqueness,individual reasonableness,efficiency,symmetry and regular affinity. The result shows that although the compromise solution is similar with τ-value,it has rational behavior and meets the principle of reasonableness.

关 键 词：NTU模糊结盟对策 凸对策 妥协值 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]