企业控制权安排的隐性激励效果分析及控制权安排效率改进  

Invisible Stimulus Effects of Corporate Right of Control

作　　者：王春秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南民族大学管理学院,云南昆明650031

出　　处：《云南民族大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2010年第6期77-81,共5页Journal of Yunnan Minzu University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：云南省教育厅重点项目"家庭企业成长过程中控制权转移问题研究"(项目编号:08Z0050)阶段成果

摘　　要：控制权具有激励作用,激励作用不仅有物质上的也有精神上的。精神上的激励是隐性的,如果为满足权力欲望,控制权带来的满足感无法激发经理人提高努力水平。如果经理人通过行使控制权,在经营事业上满足自我实现的需要,激励能带来委托—代理双方效用的提高。因此,改善和提高控制权安排效率的路径有:机动灵活的弹性激励契约、多元化的监督机制、外部有效市场下的竞争激励以及选拔自我价值实现感强的职业经理人。The introduction of professional managers to China＇s small and medium family businesses is an efficient way for them to obtain social management capital.The good arrangement of the right of control between entrepreneurs and managers has positive effects on the corporate management.Previous studies have focused on the transfer obstacles of the right of control and could not well explain the corporate internal sharing of right.With the help of the principal-agent theory,this paper focuses on the arrangement of the right of control and analyzes its effects on the manager＇s invisible stimulus as well as the factors affecting this arrangement.It finally brings up some suggestions for improving the arrangement of the right of control for China＇s small and medium family businesses.

关 键 词：控制权 隐性激励 安排效率 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]