制造业务外包中的质量与交货期联合决策问题研究  

Joint Decision-Making on Products' Quality and Delivery in Outsourcing

作　　者：田厚平[1] 刘长贤[1] 刘书款[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第4期161-166,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901042);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC630122);南京理工大学自主科研专项计划资助项目(2010ZYTS040);南京理工大学"卓越计划紫金之星"及经济管理学院资助项目(JGYY0603;JGYY0801)

摘　　要：研究了信息不对称条件下,发包人如何激励承包人同时提高产品质量与准时交货率的联合决策问题。考虑到三种常见的支付机制:固定支付、奖励机制与惩罚机制,构建了信息不对称条件下的质量与交货期联合决策模型。结果表明,最优契约为以上三种机制的适当组合。同时,结果还表明,以上三种机制存在一定的相互匹配关系:高固定支付与高惩罚、低奖励机制相匹配;而低固定支付与低惩罚、高奖励机制相匹配。最后,结果显示,发包人可以根据任务性质,通过适当配置产品质量与准时交货率权重来激励承包人更好地完成外包任务。The joint decision-making problem on products＇ quality and delivery performance is discussed.In view of three pay mechanisms such as fixed payment,bonus and penalty mechanism,the joint decision-making model is presented.The results show that optimal contract is the combination of above three mechanisms.Furthermore,the results indicate that there exists a matching relationship among these mechanisms： The more the fixed payment,the higher the penalty and the lower the bonus;on the other hand,the lower the fixed payment,the less the penalty and the more the bonus.Finally,the results show that the principal can give the supplier better incentives by allocating the weights of products＇ quality and delivery according to the feature of the task.

关 键 词：业务外包 委托-代理模型 联合决策 产品质量 准时交货率 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]