新农村基础设施建设中农民合作意愿的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Willingness for Farmers in Rural Infrastructure

作　　者：房保言[1] 田双亮[1] 王志刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北民族大学数学与计算机科学学院,甘肃兰州730124 [2]西安交通大学阳光中学,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《西北民族大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第3期14-19,共6页Journal of Northwest Minzu University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家民委科研基金资助项目(08XB07);西北民族大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(ycx10114)

摘　　要：农村基础设施对于农民、农村、农业具有重要作用.但由于国家的投资力度较小、集体投资能力不足,农户自主供给公共基础设施的积极性不高,我国农村基础设施投资远不能满足农村发展的需要.文章基于进化博弈理论,在政府和农民之间的供应公共设施的博弈关系上,分析了农民的理性选择.在进化博弈分析的基础上,提出了政府在制度创新时,应注重调动各方的积极性,建立良好的激励机制,并完善农村现有机制的决策.The rural infrastructure has an important role for the rural,agriculture and farmers.However,due to lower investment of the country and lack of capacity for collective investment,the farmers own supply of public infrastructure are not active,govnerment investment in rural infrastructure can not meet the needs of rural development.Based on evolutionary game theory,the rational choice of farmers was analyzed in the light of relationship on the supply of public facilities between government and farmers.Furthermore,the present paper suggested the govnerment should focus on mobilizing the enthusiasm of all parties,to establish a good incentive mechanism,and improve the existing mechanisms in decision-making in rural areas when the government make system innovation.

关 键 词：农村基础设施 进化博弈分析 合作 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]