新股发行市场的审计师选择——来自2006年—2008年的数据  

Auditor Choice of Initial Public Offering Market: Data from 2006 to 2008

作　　者：肖小凤[1] 唐红[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]湖南财经高等专科学校,湖南长沙410205

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2010年第6期37-43,共7页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-06-0701);湖南省软科学项目(2008ZK3095);湖南省高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目;湖南省高校创新平台开放基金项目(09138)

摘　　要：信号传递理论认为,在有效市场的条件下,IPO市场中审计师选择可以作为信号传递机制,降低发行企业和投资者之间的信息不对称程度。在我国实施股权分置改革以及证券发行保荐制的背景下,通过考察我国审计师声誉和IPO企业特征之间的关系后发现,股权分置改革和证券发行制度的市场化改革增加了对高质量审计的需求,事前风险更低的公司倾向于选择高声誉事务所,且高声誉审计师审计的IPO企业的首日回报显著要低。这说明大规模事务所的高声誉得到了市场的认可,审计师的信号传递功能在我国初显成效。Signal theory suggests that,in the IPO market,the auditor choice can be used as a signal mechanism to reduce information asymmetries between issuing companies and investors.Under the background of China＇s split share structure reform and securities issuing system transition to market-oriented,we examine the relationship between the IPO firm characteristics and auditor reputation.The results show that reform has triggered a strong demand for high quality audit.Companies with lower risk have a significant positive relationship with the choice of big-four audit firms.Furthermore,clients that hire big-four exhibit lower initial returns than clients that choose to hire other audit firms,which means big-four＇s high reputation has been recognized by the market.These results indicate that the signal transmission function of an auditor proves valid in China.

关 键 词：信号传递 审计师选择 审计师声誉 新股发行市场 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]