基于批发价定价权转移的制造商渠道选择  

Analysis of the Channel Selection of Manufacturer under the Wholesale Pricing Power Vertical Transfer

作　　者：于辉[1] 王菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《工业工程》2010年第5期35-39,64,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871126;90924009);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划基金资助项目(NCET-10-0843);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100211)

摘　　要：制造商的批发价定价权发生转移会带来供应链绩效增加和制造商利润降低。利用这一供应链特征,给出了制造商渠道选择的数理方法。制造商在零售商具有/不具有批发价定价权的渠道选择中,潜在的市场规模是关键的选择因素。研究表明:市场规模相同时,制造商会选择拥有批发价定价权的渠道;当拥有批发价定价权的零售商拥有较大市场规模时,制造商会选择该供应链渠道,而此时对供应链双方都具有价值。While the transfer of wholesale pricing power from manufacturers to retailers improves the profit of the supply chain,it reduces the profit of the manufacturers.A supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is considered in this paper.In the supply chain,the manufacturer can choose its marketing channel according to the marketing advantage for the manufacturer and retailer.Mathematical models are presented for different marketing channels with wholesale pricing power for the manufacturer and retailer.Based on the models,analysis shows that when the retailer has no marketing advantage,the manufacturer can gain more profit if it does not transfer its wholesale pricing power into the retailer.However,when the retailer has marketing advantage the transfer of wholesale pricing power will be beneficial to both sides of the supply chain.

关 键 词：渠道选择 批发价定价权 供应链管理 

分 类 号：F406.7[经济管理—产业经济]