上市公司财务预测信息披露的博弈分析及其治理  

A Game Analysis of Financial Forecast Information Disclosure of Listed Companies and Its Governance

作　　者：蒋尧明[1,2] 谭军[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心,江西南昌330013 [2]江西财经大学当代财经杂志社,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《经济经纬》2010年第6期81-85,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：江西财经大学研究生创新基金项目(YC09A078)

摘　　要：笔者基于上市公司财务预测信息披露的动因,运用博弈论对上市公司是否自愿披露以及是否真实披露财务预测信息进行分析,研究表明,上市公司的财务预测信息披露行为是各参与方基于自身利益最大化所做出的行动相互影响的结果,应当从上市公司内部和外部两个方面对财务预测信息披露进行治理,以期引导财务预测信息的披露并提高其质量。Based on the motives for the financial forecast information disclosure of listed companies,with game theory,the authors analyze whether listed companies are willing to disclose financial forecast information and whether the information is real.The research suggests that financial forecast information disclosure is the result of the interaction of stakeholders wishing to maximize their own benefits.Financial forecast information disclosure should be governed from within and outside listed companies to guide the financial forecast information disclosure and improve its quality.

关 键 词：财务预测信息 动因 博弈 治理 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]