政府与旅游企业环境保护效率的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis on Environmental Protection Efficiency for the Government and Tourism Enterprises

作　　者：袁正新[1] 黎克双[1] 彭国庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉首大学旅游学院,张家界427000

出　　处：《管理学家（学术版）》2010年第10期20-24,共5页

基　　金：湖南省生态旅游应用技术重点实验室;湖南省自然与文化遗产研究基地项目

摘　　要：针对旅游地环境保护中政府与旅游企业政策执行的动态不一致,文章应用博弈分析原理,对旅游企业理性和政府理性的矛盾进行研究,分析了导致这一原因的动力机制以及这一结论导致的环境保护低效率问题及其影响,探讨在决策旅游企业个体内在的个体理性基础上如何达到集体理性,从而实现旅游地的可持续发展。主要结论是:政府在合同上的守信有利于达到新的对双方有利的纳什均衡,提高环境保护的效率,并对如何实现政府政策的动态一致性给出了制度上的建议。Focusing on dynamic inconsistency of the policy implementation in environment protection for the government and tourism enterprises, by applying the theory of game analysis, the paper studied the contradiction between the tourism enterprises rationality and government rationality, analyzed the causes that led to the dynamic mechanism and the problem of low environmental protection efficiency and its impact, explored how to achieve collective rationality on the basis of individual rationality within tourism enterprises so as to achieve the sustainable tourism in tourism attraction. The main conclusions： the trustworthiness of the government on the contract will help to reach a new Nash equilibrium of mutual benefit and improve the efficiency of environmental protection, and the suggestions are given on how to achieve the dynamic consistency of the government policies.

关 键 词：动态一致性 制度 博弈 环保效率 

分 类 号：F590[经济管理—旅游管理]