协调博弈均衡的稳定性研究  

On the Stochastic Stability of Equilibrium in Coordination Game

作　　者：张良桥[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [2]顺德职业技术学院,广东顺德528333

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2010年第6期83-87,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金(09ZDB17&09ZDB18);广东省自然科学基金(05300601)

摘　　要：针对不变突变率模型的缺陷,结合心理学、社会学等成果,通过在吸引域离开阻抗中引入意向因素而拓展了不变突变率模型,研究了意向因素影响下协调博弈均衡的稳定性,探讨了均衡结果与影响因素之间的数量关系,模型可为决策者驾驭经济演化系统提供理论依据。To overcome the shortcomings of constant mutation rate model,we extend traditional theoretical models by incorporating background mutation and deliberation mutation into resistance,which is suggested by literatures in psychology and sociology.Multiple equilibriums under the influence of stochastic deliberation factors are studied systematically as well.Afterwards,we investigate quantitively the relation between the equilibrium outcomes of coordination games and the corresponding affecting factors.Conclusions drawn from our model can offer theoretical foundations for decision makers to manage economic evolutionary systems.

关 键 词：协调博弈 意向因素 随机稳定状态 

分 类 号：F019.1[经济管理—政治经济学]