董事会结构与高管报酬研究——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据  

Research on Relationship between Board Structure and Top Management Compensation:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Private Companies

作　　者：向锐[1] 李琪琦[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学会计系,四川成都610065 [2]中国人民银行成都分行,四川成都610074

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2010年第2期56-63,共8页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目(20080430782)的资助;西南财经大学创新人才培养基金项目的资助

摘　　要：由于现代企业所有权与控制权的分离,公司高管人员往往利用信息不对称获取高额报酬,给股东造成"剩余损失"。对处于经济转轨时期的中国而言,上市公司同样面临着高管报酬激励的代理冲突问题。董事会是公司重要的内部控制机制,其存在可以影响上市公司的高管报酬。然而,目前国内很少有对高管报酬与董事会结构之间的关系进行实证研究的成果。为此,以2004年—2006年在深沪交易所上市的民营企业为样本,分析董事会结构对上市公司高管报酬的影响。Owing to the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation,top managers obtain excessive levels of management compensation and bring ＂residual loss＂ to shareholders by asymmetric information.China was also confronted with this problem in the period of the transiting economy.The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting top management compensation.However,there are few researches on the relationship between board structure and top management compensation.This paper will analyze the effect of board structure on top management compensation based on a dataset consisting of listed private firms from both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2006.

关 键 词：民营上市公司 董事会结构 高管报酬 

分 类 号：F253.7[经济管理—国民经济]