高空抛物侵权责任的法律经济分析——以博弈论为视角  

A Law and Economic Analysis of High Building Throwing Tort Liability from Game Theory

作　　者：郑坤[1] 万雅琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]郧阳师范高等专科学校政史系,湖北十堰442000

出　　处：《郧阳师范高等专科学校学报》2010年第5期116-119,共4页Journal of Yunyang Teachers College

摘　　要：从法律经济分析角度而言,《侵权责任法》中的高空抛物侵权责任实际上是加害人与无辜第三人之间的博弈,由于机会成本对无辜第三人一方影响巨大,所以实际均衡与纳什均衡不一致,而这意味着现行高空抛物侵权责任的立法是无效率的。在高空抛物侵权的各种救济方案中,物业公司赔偿方案是最妥当的,因为在此方案下,博弈双方变成了加害人和物业公司,博弈的结果是,实际均衡与纳什均衡完全一致,这意味着物业公司赔偿方案比现行高空抛物侵权责任立法更有效率。High building throwing tort liability in Tort Liability Act,from law and economic analysis,is the game between the injuring party and the innocent third party.Opportunity cost has a great influence upon the innocent third party,so the real balance is not same to Nash equilibrium,which means that the Act is invalid.Among the rescuing plans in high building throwing tort,the property management company compensating plan is the best,for the two parties are changed into the injuring party and property management company,and the result is that real balance and Nash equilibrium are completely same,which means that property management company compensating plan is more effective than the current Act.

关 键 词：高空抛物侵权责任 法律经济分析 博弈论 纳什均衡 机会成本 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学]