普特南内在实在论的多重面孔  

The Many Faces of Putnam's Internal Realism

作　　者：董礼[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心,北京100875 [2]北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2010年第6期5-9,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：普特南一生曾提出过多种实在论。我们认为,他最近的观点实际上仍是一种在实在论和反实在论之间的联合,即他先前所谓的"内在实在论"。要准确把握普特南内在实在论,就必须澄清他是如何克服形而上学实在论:即破除关于真理和理性的客观性和主观性的二分和破除事实和价值的二分。我们主要讨论"常识实在论"和"实用主义实在论"与"内在实在论"的关系。Putnam has developed several realisms in his life.We think that his recent view is a conjunction between realism and anti-realism,which he called ＇internal realism＇.If we want to know Putnam＇s internal realism correctly,we must clarify how he overcomes metaphysical realism,in which he argues against the subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy and the fact/value dichotomy.We mainly discuss the relationship between ＇common-sense realism＇ and ＇internal realism＇,and the relationship between ＇pragmatic realism＇ and ＇internal realism＇.

关 键 词：内在实在论 形而上学实在论 常识实在论 实用主义实在论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]