我国分权治理下产业升级与区域协调发展研究——地方政府的激励不相容与选择偏好的模型分析  

Industrial Upgrading and Regional Coordinated Development under Decentralization Governance in China:Analysis of Incentive Incompatibility and Select Preference of Local Governments

作　　者：张少军[1] 刘志彪[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084 [2]南京大学长江三角洲经济社会发展研究中心,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《财经研究》2010年第12期83-93,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08CJY005);中国博士后科学基金项目(20090460385);山东省软科学项目(2010RKGB1124)

摘　　要：区域协调发展作为中国产业升级的渠道和方式,在开放经济条件下显得愈发重要。文章首先以中国公共组织的分权式治理结构为背景,通过一个完全信息动态博弈模型对中国产业升级和区域协调发展进行了系统研究,结果发现以财政分权和政治晋升为特征的分权治理结构存在激励不相容性,从而导致了地方政府倾向于"分割"策略;其次,通过双重任务委托—代理模型的构建,从双重任务互替、独立和互补三种情形考察了市场环境的变化如何影响地方政府的努力水平;最后,文章从政府规制的角度提出相关政策建议,以期在政府之间建立一个激励相容的契约关系。Regional coordinated development,as a way of industrial upgrading in China,is of great importance in open economy.From the angle of decentralization governance structure of public organizations in China,this paper makes a systematic study on industrial upgrading and regional coordinated development through a dynamic game model of complete information.The result shows that the structure of decentralization governance which is featured by fiscal decentralization and political promotion is incentive-incompatible,leading to local governments＇ preference for split strategy.Then it analyzes the effect of the change of market environment on the effort levels of local governments by constructing a dualtask client-agency model.At last,it puts forth some policy proposal in order to build a contract relation with incentive compatibility among governments.

关 键 词：分权治理 产业升级 区域协调发展 激励相容 地方政府 

分 类 号：F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.9