基于谈判能力与网络效应的零售业通道费研究  

A Research over the Slotting Allowance of Retail Industry Based on Bargaining Power and Network Effects

作　　者：李玉峰[1] 郑栋伟[2] 陈宏民[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海海洋大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]中国建设银行上海分行,上海200030 [3]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2010年第6期40-45,共6页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672070);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(06JA630038)

摘　　要：通道费是零售商发展到一定阶段后其市场力量增强的产物,这种市场力量主要来源于其更高的销售效率和更显著的网络效应。研究表明,通道费是协调渠道成员利益关系的重要工具,零售商并没有滥用这种市场力量,政府没有必要对超市收取通道费的行为进行限制,而是应将政策重点放在通道费的调整和规范上。The slotting allowance reflects the retailers＇ strenthening market power when they developed to a certain stage. This market power resulted from its more efficient sales and stronger network effects. Research shows that the slotting allowance is one important tool used to coordinate the profits distribution between the channel members. The retailers have not abused its market power. So the government does not need to limit the behavior of supermarket on slotting allowance, but instead focus on how to adjust and regulate slotting allowance.

关 键 词：通道费 零售业 大型连锁超市 流通渠道 

分 类 号：F721.7[经济管理—产业经济]