从威慑到最优执法理论：经济学的视角  

A Survey on the Economics Theory of Law Enforcement:From Deterrence to Optimization

作　　者：杨晓维[1] 张云辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博导,北京100875 [2]哈尔滨理工大学经济学院副教授、博士,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《南京社会科学》2010年第12期16-23,共8页Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

摘　　要：早期的执法经济理论,关注如何通过惩罚违法者威慑潜在违法行为。然而,考虑到执法本身的成本,特别是当法律本身非优化时违法行为带来的外部收益(或执法的成本),简单地威慑执法带来的成本可能大于收益。因此,以社会福利最大化为执法目标的最优执法理论认为,并非对所有违法行为都要实施威慑,只有当执法收益在边际上大于执法成本时,惩罚违法者才是有效率的。基于相关文献,本文试图梳理和介绍执法经济理论的基本发展脉络和思想。The main idea of the early economic theory of law enforcement is about how to deter potential violations by punishing offenders.However,simple deterrence may lead to the cost of law enforcement greater than benefits given the cost of law enforcement itself,especially when the law itself is non-optimized and the offenses cause external benefits（or costs of law enforcement）.Therefore,the thought of the optimal law enforcement theory which aims to maximize social welfare is not to deter all violations and also puts forward that punishing violators is efficient only when the marginal return of law enforcement is greater than the marginal cost.Based on the related literature,the basic idea of the law enforcement economic theory and the context of its development are sorted out and introduced in this paper.

关 键 词：威慑执法 最优执法 执法成本 

分 类 号：F061.4[经济管理—政治经济学] DF0-059[政治法律—法学理论]