基于竞争考虑MBO与ESOP的国有企业产权改革模型研究  

A Study on Competition-based SOE's Property Right Reform Model under MBO and ESOP

作　　者：孟庆春[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济管理》2010年第12期137-142,共6页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金"基于动态博弈与演化博弈的国有企业改革的系统研究"(2008Bs08005);韩国高等教育财团国际学术交流资助项目(2009~2010)

摘　　要：本文在Cournot竞争的基础上构建了包含MBO与ESOP的国有企业产权改革模型,讨论了MBO、ESOP与混合产权国有企业的产出、收益、利润以及社会福利等之间的关系。结果表明:在混合产权的国有企业中,当国有企业生产效率相对高时,MBO比重增大将会使国有企业利润和社会福利下降,当国有企业生产效率相对低时,MBO比重增大将会使国有企业利润和社会福利增加;ESOP比重变化对社会福利产生的影响,除了取决于国有企业与私营企业之间的生产效率对比外,还与整体市场需求、国有企业的成本函数结构以及国有资本对政府政策目标的关注程度等密切相关。This paper constructs the SOE＇s property right reform model including MBO and ESOP based on Cournot competition,and the relations between MBO and ESOP and the output,total revenue and profit of the SOE of the mixed property right and the social welfare etc. are discussed. The results show that in the SOE of mixed property right, the increasing of the ratio of MBO will decrease the profit of the SOE and the social welfare when the production efficiency of the SOE is relatively high, and the increasing of the ratio of MBO will increase the profit of the SOE and the social welfare when the production efficiency of the SOE is relatively low ; the effect of the change of the ratio of ESOP on the social welfare is not only decided by the contrast of the production efficiency between the SOE and the private enterprise but also closed with the whole market demand, the structure of the cost function of the SOE, the level that the state-owned capital pays attention to the policy objective of the government and etc.

关 键 词：产权改革 COURNOT竞争 MBO与ESOP 生产效率 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] C270