从审计师成为客户高管:对旋转门现象的一项案例研究  

From an Auditor to Being a Manager of Auditee:A Revolving Door Case in China

作　　者：吴溪[1] 王晓[1] 姚远[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2010年第11期72-80,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于注册会计师个体视角的中国证券市场审计行为研究"(批准号70602020)的阶段性成果;北京市教育委员会共建项目;中央财经大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目资助

摘　　要：在安然事件等一系列公司丑闻后,审计师到审计客户担任高层管理人员的"旋转门"现象受到了更多的关注和监管。通过中国证券市场中审计师担任其上市客户财务高管的一则案例,本文考察了审计师与客户雇佣关系形成的过程以及形成前后的财务报告与审计特征,并重点探析了旋转门现象的前因。基于案例分析的证据显示,在审计师与客户形成雇佣关系之前存在着审计质量减损的若干迹象,从而可作为旋转门现象内在机理的一种解释。此外我们发现,在审计师与客户形成雇佣关系的过程中,以及雇佣关系形成之后的财务报告与审计特征,也都存在着若干异常表现。Following a number of high profile corporate scandals such as Enron,the revolving door practice from an auditor to a manager of the audited client is more strictly regulated.There has been an emerging body of literature on the revolving door practice.However,most studies have focused on tests around the occurrence of the practice(particularly subsequent to the event),and have provided mixed results.Moreover,little has been known about the antecedents to the revolving door events and the mechanism of formation of such practices.Based on analyses of a typical revolving door case in China's stock market,we document evidence that suggests compromised audit quality prior to the revolving door event.We attribute such evidence as an interpretation of the formation of revolving door practice.Moreover,we also find some anomalies both during and after the process of revolving door practice.

关 键 词：审计师 审计客户 高管 旋转门现象 案例 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]